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~~contains some per~~
~~enables the Interpreter~~

A "Sign" is an Ens (i.e. something of ~~any~~ some category of being) and it may be of any which, ~~in addition to~~ not only has a capacity of being either imagined, perceived, or conceived, as anything of the same category of Being of which one ~~has~~ ~~[illegible]~~ happens to have enough of the right kind of dealings may be but also has ~~a capacity~~ the property ~~power~~ under of producing ~~in a mind~~ through ~~which perceives it and which has skill, or practical~~ upon a person ~~who fulfills~~ in whom certain conditions are fulfiller ~~so~~ effects that another thing or a collection of other things would ~~fulfill~~ produce, those conditions being the possession by that person of a practical understanding of the system of correspondence

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But this definition ought to be prefaced with the remark that no ~~[illegible]~~ event of learning anything brings per se any ~~[illegible]~~ other knowledge than ~~its content~~ that which is in learned; and in particular does not include any knowledge about that event of learning ~~is~~ itself. Thus seeing does include a sight of the eye or any knowledge about the learning itself. True, Hamilton and others insist that to know includes the knower's knowing that ~~one~~ he knows; and in the limited sense in which he ~~[illegible]~~ here used the word know, one must admit that something is true which those words seem to express. ~~But it~~ Nevertheless, merely knowing a fact does not include ~~that~~ the knowledge that that very act, per se includes any knowledge about itself, any more than seeing includes any vision of ~~[illegible]~~ the event of sight itself. When one fitch comes to ~~[illegible]~~ that the number of ~~edges~~ in any solid is less by 2 than the sum of the numbers of distinct surfaces and of summits (that has no hole through it nor any hole enclosed in it, the number of edges ~~[illegible]~~ even no. of the former ~~has~~ is ~~[illegible]~~ by three or more edges and that every one of the latter simply extends from one summit to another), ~~he is thinking~~ his thoughts is exclusively occupied with ~~[illegible]~~ solid and ~~[illegible]~~ its parts, and he is not thinking all all of himself or his knowledge. And if Hamilton does not ~~call~~ call an assent, however unqualified and confident, by the name of "Knowledge" unless it be accompanied by a recognition of its acceptance by the knower, then it is undoubtedly true that to know is to know that one knows that which one knows, but it still remains false that to know is to know that one knows that one knows ~~that~~ one's knowledge of the ~~former~~ the knowing that one knows it, ~~[illegible]~~ the sense of actually thinking it, though one undoubtedly has what the scholastics call an habitual knowledge of it, that is to say a disposition to accept it as soon as the question occurs to the person

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