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To appear in I. Angelelli y M. Cerezo, eds., Proceedings of the III Symposium on History of Logic, Gruyter, Berlin, 1996 Since there is no normal pagination on a web page, paragraph numbers are assigned here in lieu of that, included in brackets and placed flush right, just above the paragraph, for purposes of scholarly reference. |
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[1]
It is now over thirty years since Richard Rorty pointed out
the similarities between Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations (1953) and the philosophical framework of Charles
S. Peirce (1839-1914), the American logician who was the founder
of pragmatism. The view put forward by Rorty is that Peirce had
envisaged and repudiated positivist empiricism fifty years
earlier, and had developed a set of insights and a philosophical
mood very similar to those of contemporary philosophers working
under the influence of the later Wittgenstein. The affinity
between Peirce's philosophy and the more recent tendency born of
the rejection of the Tractatus and the positivism of the Vienna
Circle, gave rise to an expectation that the study of Peircean
pragmatism and the writings of the later Wittgenstein in ever
closer comparison would shed increasing light on both
philosophers' work (Rorty 1961).
[2]
Similarly, on a more recent occasion Christopher Hookway
emphasised that the best approach for understanding Peirce is to
see him as an analytic philosopher avant la lettre. It is well
known that Karl-Otto Apel identified Peirce's thought as the
milestone in the process of semiotic transformation from
transcendental philosophy into analytic philosophy (Apel 1981).
Many of the distinctive features of analytic philosophy are
already present in Peirce, and many of the problems which
concerned Peirce most are central to contemporary philosophical
debate. In this sense, the best way to approach Peirce is by
assuming that he was attempting something similar to present-day
analytic philosophy of language, as both his goals and his basic
ideas have much in common with the latter (Hookway 1985: 141).
[3]
In spite of this proximity, academic research focusing on
the thought of Wittgenstein and Peirce has almost always tended
to handle these two writers quite separately. It has sometimes
been said that the notoriously pragmatist flavour of
Philosophical Investigations was due to the influence of Frank
P. Ramsey: according to this interpretation, it was the young
Ramsey who, by awakening Wittgenstein from the dogmatic slumber
of the Tractatus, guided Wittgenstein's reflections in a
pragmatic direction (Passmore 1957: 425). However, little precise
information is available as to the actual way in which American
pragmatist philosophy might have helped mould the thought of the
later Wittgenstein.
[4]
The writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein do not contain a single
mention of Charles S. Peirce, but it might well be wrong to draw
any conclusions from this, as Wittgenstein's scant regard for the
academic practice of acknowledging intellectual property is
notorious. In both the preface to the Tractatus and that of the
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein apologises for not
using the traditional bibliographical apparatus in work of an
academic nature: "I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me
whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by
another" (1922: 27). "For more than one reason what I publish
here will have points of contact with what another people are
writing today. If my remarks do not bear a stamp which marks
them as mine, I do not wish to lay any further claim to them as
my property" (1988: 17).
[5]
In fact, neither Wittgenstein's pupils nor his colleagues
recall hearing him mention Charles S. Peirce (Hardwick 1979: 30,
n.5). By contrast to this, towards the end of his life
Wittgenstein took a considerable interest in William James, and
read his work. In his lectures, Wittgenstein refers to him fairly
often in order to illustrate the confusions to which the mind is
subject in philosophy, and for a while William James's The
Principles of Psychology was the only book Wittgenstein kept in
his room (Thayer 1968: 313).
[6]
In 1968 H.S. Thayer gave voice to a hope that a historian
would one day clear up the question of the relationship between
American pragmatism and Wittgenstein's thought. Twenty-five years
later, however, the relations between Wittgenstein and Peirce are
still not wholly explained, as we lack any proof of a direct
link. There are some connections, in the form of people who had
some kind of link with Peirce and were in direct contact with
Wittgenstein; but as Hardwick indicated (1979: 26), the missing
link probably lies in Wittgenstein's conversations with Ramsey in
the last two years of the latter's life. "What Wittgenstein owed
to Peirce is not easy to say," Deledalle writes (1990: 134), but
the suggestion that the pragmatic vein running through the later
Wittgenstein is of a Peircean nature would seem plausible
(Hardwick 1979: 25).
[7]
In concrete, the aim of my paper is to describe in some
detail not so much the overlap between Peirce and the later
Wittgenstein, which has been discussed by various scholars
(Mullin 1961; Rorty 1961; Ransdell 1976; Bambrough 1981; Haack
1982; Gorlee 1989; Hookway 1990; Fabbrichesi 1993), as the
concrete lines along which academic research has established the
historical connection between the two philosophers. To this end,
now that I have outlined the background to my paper, I propose to
divide my discussion into three parts of different lengths. First
I shall summarise the information available about Peirce's
reception in British philosophy in the first thirty years of this
century, with particular reference to Lady Welby, Charles Ogden
and Bertrand Russell. I shall then report in some detail on Frank
Ramsey's role as the link between Peirce and Wittgenstein.
Finally, by way of conclusion, I shall provide a brief overall
evaluation of the academic research into the relations between
these two thinkers.
[8]
1. Peirce's reception in British philosophy: Lady Welby, Ogden
and Russell. Victoria Welby was Peirce's main intellectual contact in the last years of his life, when he was living the life of an impoverished hermit in Milford, Pennsylvania. Lady Welby was a leading figure in British semiotics at the turn of the century. She had no formal university education, but was an enthusiast for the study of signification, and had invented a new science of language, which she called "Significs". She contributed to Mind, and knew personally or corresponded with many of the intellectuals of the day. [9]
The epistolary relationship between Peirce and Lady Welby,
which was to last nine years, started in 1903, when she sent him
a copy of her book What is Meaning?, which Peirce reviewed
enthusiastically together with Russell's The Principles of
Mathematics. He devoted only the first paragraph of his review
to Russell's book, reserving two pages for that of Lady Welby.
His review began with the statement "Two really important works
on logic are these; or, at any rate, they deserve to become so"
(Hardwick 1977: 157).
[10]
Lady Welby had a certain knowledge of pragmatic philosophy. She had corresponded with William James, the British pragmatist
F.C.S. Schiller, and the Italian pragmatists Vailati and
Calderoni (Hardwick 1977: xxix), and was to be responsible for
circulating Peirce's ideas in Britain. With this in mind, she
sent copies of Peirce's letter of 12 October 1904, in which he
had sketched out his complete theory of signs, to many friends
and colleagues, including Russell, Cook Wilson and Ogden. In
particular, Lady Welby had fixed upon Ogden in Cambridge as being
a student of Peirce (Lady Welby's letter, 2.5.1911; Hardwick
1977: 138-139), and she passed on to him the papers concerning
existential graphs which Peirce had sent her, which she was
unable to understand. One of Lady Welby's aspirations was to
bring about a meeting between Peirce and Russell, and in fact she
acted as an intermediary between them, though to no avail
(Hardwick 1977: xxx). Many years later, Russell was to
acknowledge that Lady Welby and F.C.S. Schiller had set a
precedent for his own philosophical development towards the
problem of the relations between language and facts, as in the
Principia Mathematica he had taken language to be something
transparent which could therefore be used without itself being
the object of attention (Russell 1959: 11).
[11]
In 1923, Charles Ogden, the former pupil of Lady Welby,
joined with I. A. Richards to publish the book The Meaning of
Meaning, which was to have a certain importance in British
philosophy. In this book, which is subtitled "A Study of the
Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of
Symbolism", Ogden included an appendix which is an introduction
to Peirce based on extracts from three of his letters to Lady
Welby (12.10.1904, 14.12.1908 and 14.3.1909) and two articles
published in The Monist in 1905 and 1906 (Ogden 1923: 432-444).
In March 1923, Ogden, who had translated and published the
Tractatus with the aid of Frank P. Ramsey, who was then a
student (Wittgenstein 1973: 8), sent a copy of The Meaning of
Meaning to Wittgenstein, who was working as a country
schoolmaster in Puchberg. In Wittgenstein's letter acknowledging
receipt of the book, he explained to Ogden that he had been
suffering from some nervous complaint for a month, and "this is
the reason why I have not yet been able to read your book
thoroughly" (Wittgenstein 1973: 69).
[12]
As Ogden believed that his book went some way towards
providing a causal solution to the problem of meaning outlined in
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein felt obliged to give an appraisal
of the book, and he answered frankly that in his view, Ogden had
not entirely grasped the problems which he had tackled in
Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1973: 69). In a letter to Russell on 7
April, he went further on the subject of The Meaning of
Meaning: "Is it not a miserable book?! Philosophy is not as easy
as that! The worst thing is the introduction of Professor
Postgate Litt. D. F. B. A. etc. etc. I have seldom read anything
so foolish." (Monk 1991: 214).
[13]
This introduction was in fact omitted from later editions.
In view of this reaction, Wittgenstein may well not have reached
the final pages of The Meaning of Meaning which included the
passages from Peirce, but it is also possible that he did indeed
read this section and thus had his first exposure to Peirce's
thought. In any case, he must have read the highly favourable
references to Peirce in the preface, where he figures among the
authors whose ideas Ogden and Richards acknowledge, as well as
the first page, on which it is stated that Peirce had recognised
the importance of the problem of meaning, but had felt that he
should forego his ambition to attempt to solve it on the grounds
of his advanced years and financial hardship (1923: ix and 1).
Even so, Ogden's account is somewhat confusing, focusing as it
does especially on classifications, and tends rather to
discourage the reader from taking on Peirce directly. Hardwick
was able to show that the posture adopted by Ogden and Richards
in The Meaning of Meaning was, in the last instance,
incompatible with that of Peirce, because even though they
defended a triadic relationship between thought, symbol and
reference, they did so in a simplistic manner which quite lacks
the breadth and subtlety of Peirce's semiotics (1979: 27).
[14]
In The Principles of Mathematics #164# 27 Bertrand Russell
acknowledged the importance of Peirce's work on logic,
particularly his algebra of diadic relationships. "I have always
thought very highly of Dr. Peirce for having introduced such a
method," he wrote later to Lady Welby (Hardwick 1977: xxx). In
fact, Peirce's modifications to Boole's logic had been known and
valued among European logicians and mathematicians in general
terms ever since Schrëder's extensive discussion of them in his
Algebra der Logik. (In the 1898 Cambridge Lectures, published
just a few months ago, Peirce remarks light-heartedly that
Schrëder seemed to have fallen in love with his algebra of diadic
relationships. Peirce 1992: 150.) In British philosophical
circles, some works of James and Dewey were also known, although
they were probably not subjected to careful scrutiny (Thayer
1968: 304-305). At the international philosophy conferences in
1900, 1904 and especially the one held in Heidelberg in 1908, the
pragmatist propositions of the American philosophers were the
focus of international debate (Geldsetzer 1981).
[15]
Up to 1923, however, Russell showed not the slightest
interest in Peircean semiotics, despite attempts to bring them
together on the part of Lady Welby, who believed that the work of
Russell and Peirce confirmed her semantic theories. Years later
Russell wrote that:
[16]
That anthology, published by Morris Cohen in 1923, had a
clear and accurate introduction to the main issues in Peirce's
philosophy and distinguished his ideas from James' pragmatism.
Alfred J. Ayer stressed the historical interest of this
selection, since until then English philosophers had derived
their mainly unfavourable ideas of pragmatism from the popular
writings of James and Schiller (Ayer 1968: 4). Along this line,
Susan Haack has suggested that the root of the uncongeniality
between Russell and pragmatist philosophy can perhaps be traced
back, at least in part, to Russell's personal hostility towards
F. C. S. Schiller as a representative pragmatist. Although in
Wisdom of the West Russell was to write that Peirce had been
beyond doubt "one of the most original minds of the end of the
later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American
thinker ever" (1959: 267), these quotations serve to indicate
that Russell's acquaintance with Peircean thought was probably
very limited and, in any case, it long postdates the end of his
relations with Wittgenstein.
[17]
2. Frank Ramsey as link The relationship between Frank P. Ramsey (1903-30) and Wittgenstein is well known, and Wittgenstein duly acknowledges Ramsey's influence in the preface to Philosophical Investigations:
[18] Ramsey's connection with Peirce's writing and ideas proves
to have been closer than that of Ogden, and is well documented.
Ramsey had become aware of Peirce's logic through Russell,
Schroeder and, perhaps, the detailed outline provided by C. I.
Lewis in A Survey of Symbolic Logic (1918). Thayer suggests
that Ramsey may have heard about Peirce's interest in the theory
of signs and meaning from Russell (1968: 305), but it was
certainly Ogden, whom he had helped on the translation of the
Tractatus at the age of eighteen, who was his main source of
information about Peirce's work.
[19]
2.1. References to Peirce in Ramsey's writing Below is a brief outline of the evidence for Ramsey's knowledge of Peirce's work: [20]
1923. In Ramsey's long and perceptive review of the Tractatus
in Mind, the only person quoted apart from Russell and
Wittgenstein himself was Charles S. Peirce. Ramsey pointed out
(1923: 468) that the use of "proposition" in Tractatus, unlike
Russell's use of the word in The Principles of Mathematics, was
ambiguous, and that this ambiguity could have been avoided had
Wittgenstein introduced Peirce's distinction between "type" and
"token". We know that Ramsey had already written this review
before visiting Wittgenstein in Puchberg, but it is not known
whether they talked about this observation in the visits of 1923
and 1924 (Thayer 1968: 310).
[21]
1924. In Ramsey's rather critical review of The Meaning of
Meaning by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, published the next
year in Mind, he emphasises that "the excellent appendix on
Peirce deserves especial mention" (1924: 109). Ramsey was greatly
impressed by the extracts from the letters to Lady Welby (Houser
and Kloesel 1992: xxii). The Meaning of Meaning (1923: 280-281)
also includes an extract from Peirce's 1906 article in The
Monist, in which he explains the distinction between "type" and
"token".
[22]
1926. In "Truth and Probability", read in part at the Moral
Sciences Club in Cambridge, then compiled posthumously in his
Philosophical Papers (1990: 52-94), Ramsey quotes Peirce on
three occasions (52, 81-2, 90n), and explicitly takes Peirce as
the basis for his final paragraphs on the pragmatic justification
for the intellectual habits of inference, observation and memory.
[23]
Ramsey maintains that induction is a habit, and that as such
it requires no logical justification, as there can be no
justification which does not proceed by induction.
That is, Ramsey maintains that induction has no formal justification, but this does not make its use any the less reasonable, as its reasonableness is pragmatic (Thayer 1968: 310). [24]
In Ramsey's short intellectual biography, this study marked
"the beginning of something new", as Sahlin has recently shown
(1990: 67, 102), as it "is imbued with the pragmatism of Peirce".
It seems clear that he owed this pragmatic orientation to his
reading of Peirce (Hookway 1980: 91). Ramsey quotes Peirce from
the anthology Chance, Love and Logic.
[25]
1927. In "Facts and Propositions" Ramsey does not quote Peirce,
but in the final paragraphs, after underlining his great debt to
Wittgenstein, "from whom my view of logic is derived", he adds:
[26]
This recognition of a gap in the Tractatus which could be
filled satisfactorily by pragmatism lends support to the
suggestion that Ramsey might have tried, in the course of his
conversations with Wittgenstein over the subsequent two years, to
explain both the problem and the pragmatist solution which he had
drafted. Yet the point should be made that in this passage, much
to the surprise of readers today, Ramsey attributes his
pragmatism to Russell, not Peirce:
[27]
The reference to Russell as the source of Ramsey's
pragmatism is certainly somewhat disconcerting, since Russell was
not a pragmatist, nor was he ever considered one. Russell knew
the works of William James, and some of Peirce's writing, but in
his publications he had never defended a pragmatist position. By
pushing the literal meaning of Ramsey's words, Hardwick
interprets it as a statement to the effect that Russell had
introduced him to pragmatism, and in fact the superficial
description of pragmatism which he puts forward is a paraphrase
of Peirce (1979: 28).
[28]
1929. Lastly, Ramsey explicitly mentions the Peircean notion of
truth as the final opinion which everyone would reach in the long
run, in "General Propositions and Causality", which was among the
work published posthumously (1990: 161).
[29]
2.2. The conversations between Ramsey and Wittgenstein in 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in January 1929, and until Ramsey's death in January 1930, Ramsey was not only his most valued counterpart in philosophical conversations, but also his closest friend. In these discussions, to borrow the interpretation put forward by Monk (1990: 260), Ramsey was a mathematician struggling with the problems of the bases of mathematics, while Wittgenstein's interests lay rather in extracting the philosophical root from which the confusion about mathematics grew. [30]
We do not know exactly what was said in these conversations,
but one of Ramsey's last essays, entitled "Philosophy", is of
particular interest in this context, as it seems to reflect his
fundamental disagreement with Wittgenstein. As Hardwick suggested
(1979: 28), "Philosophy" could be read as the most faithful
summary available of those "innumerable conversations" to which
Wittgenstein acknowledged his indebtedness in his preface to
Philosophical Investigations quoted above.
[31]
In fact, his later rejection of some of the theses of
Tractatus is in keeping with the criticisms which Ramsey sets out
here. In "Philosophy", which scarcely amounts to seven pages,
Ramsey expressly touches upon many of the issues which would
later be extensively worked over by Wittgenstein in The Blue and
Brown Books and the Philosophical Investigations: the nature
and end of philosophy, what a definition is, what it is to
understand a word and recognise whether or not a definition is
correct, vagueness, the notion of meaning as an explanation of
use and essential key to truth, the analysis of complex
sensations for which we have no name, the appeal to our own
mental states or those of others, and so on. As everyone knows,
by contrast to the views held in the Tractatus on the
figurative character of language, the meaning of which rests on
its logical structure, the later Wittgenstein advocated a much
richer analysis of language games, of human linguistic conduct in
its colourful wealth and variety.
[32]
The two explicit criticisms of Wittgenstein which Ramsey put
into writing in "Philosophy" are perceptive and well-aimed. The
first is the absurd posture of the Tractatus, which condemns
philosophy to being nonsense, then goes on to pretend "that it is
important nonsense!" (Ramsey 1990: 1). The second, which almost
closes Ramsey's note, runs as follows:
[33] Ramsey's response to this mirrors the reply which the later
Wittgenstein might have given:
[34]
Twenty years later, in Wittgenstein's last notebooks,
published by Anscombe and von Wright under the title On
Certainty, the subjects whose absence Ramsey had noted appear at
every turn: the basis for common sense beliefs, the justification
for induction, the habits of memory, what is reasonable, and so
on. As Bambrough has suggested, when in paragraph 422 of On
Certainty Wittgenstein comes close to calling himself a
pragmatist, what he has in mind is the practical dimension of
thought. Peirce's habits and Wittgenstein's language games turn
out to be alternative expressions for a common strategy of
resisting the abstract theorising of much traditional philosophy
(Bambrough 1981: 266). Furthermore, On Certainty can be
understood as a defence of critical Peircean commonsensism as
against Moore's theory of common sense.
[35]
3. Critical survey of academic research into the relations
between Wittgenstein and Peirce The oldest reference I have been able to find to the possible influence of Peirce on the thought of the later Wittgenstein dates from 1961. This is a conjecture by the Australian scholar Gasking, in a paper given at the University of Illinois in the spring of that year. Albert Mullin contrasted it with a personal communication from Bertrand Russell saying that he doubted that Peirce could have had any influence on Wittgenstein. Mullin himself concluded not only that it was improbable that one thinker should have influenced the other, on the grounds of their utterly different philosophical styles, but also that their thought is complementary rather than similar (1961: 4-5, i). [36]
In the years that followed, Thayer (1968: 304-313), Hardwick
(1977b: xxxi and 1979) and Deledalle (1981) defended the thesis
that Ramsey had brought Peirce's ideas to Wittgenstein's
attention. This would shed light on, though not entirely explain,
the clearly pragmatic aspects of the later Wittgenstein (Schmitz
1985: clii-cliii). Along these lines, Hardwick wrote in 1979 that
the importance of Peirce's influence on Wittgenstein through
Ramsey had not been fully explored, and particularly emphasised
that
[37]
In the last few years some work has been done in this
direction, despite the obstacles posed by the fact that Peirce
and Wittgenstein are the focus of two very different academic
communities between which there is little communication.
[38]
In the face of the striking disparity between the two
philosophers as far as their attitudes to science were concerned,
Joseph Ransdell highlighted the philosophical tradition or the
systematic character of their thought. He found "a fundamental
point of agreement in their philosophies" which could be
described as two versions (Wittgenstein's being the more
sceptical, that of Peirce the more optimistic) of a common
conception of human reason and language, in which these are
essentially understood not as the private property of
individuals, but rather as thought exercised communally (Ransdell
1976: 405, 431).
[39]
In 1981, Ingemund Gullvag made great play of the
similarities between Wittgenstein and Peirce to draw attention to
"the possibility that the writings of Peirce influenced
Wittgenstein indirectly, through Ramsey, and that they may, after
Ramsey's death, have influenced him directly" (1981: 83).
[40] In the same year, Renford Bambrough pointed out the broad
overlap between the two philosophers. When Wittgenstein recalls
in paragraph 81 of Philosophical Investigations that "F.P.
Ramsey once emphasised in conversation with me that logic was a
'normative science'", the Peircean scholar cannot help thinking
that Ramsey was repeating Peirce's motto, even though this
expression was not original to Peirce, and the idea is to be
found in other authors who do not use this expression. This
impression is reinforced when one goes on to hear in the
Investigations many echoes of ideas, expressions, analogies and
comparisons which are now well known thanks to the eight volumes
of Peirce's Collected Papers (Bambrough 1981: 263-264).
[41]
In 1985, Christopher Hookway cast some light on the question
of the analysis of vagueness and indeterminacy. Following in the
footsteps of Rorty 1961 and Fairbanks 1964, Hookway was able to
show that Peirce, Ramsey and the later Wittgenstein not only
agreed that the vagueness and indeterminacy of the meaning of
predicates is benign and tolerable, but all three are to be found
defending vagueness, which "is, rather, a virtue--something in
the absence of which we would simply be unable to say, or think,
or do the things we want" (Bell 1990: ix).
[42]
In view of all this information, it seems that scholarly
research into the relationship between Wittgenstein and Peirce
can scarcely yield any new facts. There is, however, a growing
interest in the unified or integrating study of the great
currents of thought which have run through the philosophy of our
century. In this framework pragmatist philosophy in the Peircean
tradition and analytic philosophy, heir to the later
Wittgenstein, can be understood as different aspects of an
integrated stream of contemporary philosophical reflection. One
of the factors which explain the success of analytic philosophy
in the United States can be traced back to that pragmatic
orientation of American academic philosophy, which takes its main
source from Peirce.
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